Introduction
The question of robustness or structural stability is an important one to ask of any equilibrium concept because of the desirability of continuity (and even differentiability, if possible) in order to do sensitivity analysis (and qualitative if not quantitative comparative statics). Such a question has been resolved affirmatively for Riley's (1979) one-dimensional concept of informational equilibrium by Huang (1984) . The importance of this result for the recent dividend signalling models based on Riley (1979) is explained in Huang (1987) . In this paper such a finding is extended to a framework of multidimensional informational asymmetries. There have recently been a number of such models. These include McAfee and McMillan's (1987) study of incentive compatibility and mechanism design in general for multidimensional quality types. Kohlleppel (1983a, b) provides an example of the non-existence of signalling equilibrium in the Spence (1974) model with both the dimension of possible types and signals equal to two. Ambarish, John and Williams (1987) as well as Hughes (1986) follow the tradition of Leland and Pyle (1977) in the context of providing financial signalling models. Finally, within the field of industrial organization Baron and Myerson (1982) as well as more recently Milgrom and Roberts (1986) in addition to Wilson (1985) provide multidimensional signalling models.
To be concrete in this paper we shall follow the particular notation and structure of the model in Quinzii and Rochet (1985) : n = (n,, . . , nk) E N with N = set of all possible hidden k-dimensional quality types of individuals; while y = ( y,, . . . , yk) E Rk, represents the possible observed investment levels by workers in k (educational) signals. There is a single constant returns to scale production technology which is available to all firms, namely s(n, y). In addition, we assume that up to a change of variables the costs of signalling are linear and separable in y, that is c(n, y) = X,(y,/n,). Every member of a continuum of workers is assumed to be choosing y to maximize the net income from signalling. Now introduce the variables x E fi, an open convex subset of Rk,(actually, we assume that D = Rk,,): x, = l/n,, for i = 1,. . . , k; this means individuals maximize H(x, y) where their net income H(x, y) is w(y) -X,(x,y,).
* I thank Ho-mou Wu for providing the impetus to consider this problem and members of the audience for their helpful comments when this was presented at the University of Oregon. This paper was prepared for presentation at the Western Economic Association International meetings in July 1987 at Vancouver, British Columbia. Finally, my thanks to an anonymous associate editor who pointed out some technical errors in an earlier version.
P. H. Huang / Robustness of multidimenswnal signalling equilibria
Now define a (separating) signalling equilibrium to be a pair of functions, (y, w), where y: N-tRk, and w: Rk,+R+ such that V n E N, these conditions are satisfied:
(a) y(n) = arg max {w(y) -c(n, y(n))} over Rk,, i.e., individual rationality, (b) w( y(n)) = s( n, y(n)), i.e., rational expectations of employer beliefs. Quinzii and Rochet (1985) prove the following three results concerning the characterization, existence, and game-theoretic 'stability' of such separating signalling equilibria: 
The space of multidimensional signalling markets
We define S to be the set of all functions s: N x Rk, + R, satisfying assumptions A.l-A.4 and some further mild technical conditions.
' Thus, if V s E S, we denote the set of signalling equilibrium by E(s), Theorem 2 tells us that V s E S, E(s) # 0. The range of E is the set Y of pairs of functions (y, w) with y: N -+ Rk, and w: Rk, -+ R,.
A natural question is to ask whether our equilibrium correspondence E: S + Y is upper hemi-continuous ' (u.h.c.) with respect to some appropriate choice of topologies on S and Y. The answer is yes, if we use the compact-open Co topology on S and Y. By Theorem 1 we associate E(s) with the solutions to u(x) = H(x, -Du(x)) for a.e. x E 52, with u(x) E P, where P is the set of differentiable real-valued functions on L?. Defining F,(U) = U(X) -H(x, -Du(x)), where s enters in the definition of H, we can identify E(s) with the zeroes of the map F"(U) over U, which is a compact set in the C' topology containing all of the convex, non-negative, and non-increasing real-valued functions over tin. Hence the study of the set of signalling equilibria E(s) reduces to studying the solutions to F,(U) = 0 for a.e. x E fi. We now define another map F(s, U) = F,(u) so F(s, u) = 0 e y(x) = -Du(x) and ' In order to ensure that S is open in A.2 we assume all the inequalities on the partials of s hold strictly [that 3K > 0 s.t.
(as/ ay,)(x, y) c KV (x, y) is no problem -just choose K > M; while the other two positivity of S, and sY conditions do actually restrict our work and exclude the so-called pure signalling case where sY = 01. We assume in addition H(x, y) is strictly concave in y and strictly convex in x as well as s being C* in order to be able to express assumptions A.3 and A.4 in terms of restictions on the sign of particular Hessians of s. * See Berge (1963) or Moore (1968) for a precise definition and complete discussion of the various notions of upper hemi-continuity appearing in the literature.
w( Y(x)) = u(x) -X,(x, au,(x)/ ax,) define a.e. x E D a (separating) signalling equilibrium for the market described by the function pair of s&c(x, y) = C,(x,y,). We are then able to prove:
Theorem A. F: S x U + P is continuous using the compact-open C' topology on U and the compactopen Co topology on S and P.
Proof. As F(s + at, u + au) Berge (1963, p. 111) or Moore (1968, p. 130 ) it suffices to prove that correspondence is closed in S, meaning that for each s in S, the hypothesis that s, + s for a sequence {s, } in S such that F(s,, u) = 0 V n implies the conclusion that
c. using the compact-open Co topology on S and Y (in addition to the compact-open C' topology on U).
Proof: E is the composition of the correspondence in Theorem B and a continuous function. Berge (1963, p. 113) has proven the composition of two u.h.c. correspondences is also u.h.c. The above defined correspondence in Theorem B has already been shown to have a closed graph. The range of that correspondence, namely U, has been chosen w.1.o.g. to be compact so that would be a u.h.c. correspondence.
The function from U to Y mapping each zero u in U of F, to a pair (y(x), w (Y( x)) that is a signalling equilibrium for s is defined in Quinzii and Rochet (1985) 
Conclusions
In summary, then upper hemi-continuity of a multidimensional signalling equilibrium correspondence under perturbations of the s function has been shown in the case of no wealth effects, that is, a multidimensional signalling model a la Spence (1974) as opposed to Riley's (1979) more generalized preferences. Thus, although there are qualitative differences between models of asymmetric information with unidimensional versus multidimensional initial quality type of endowments, like the conditions required for existence of signalling equilibria, given those respective conditions, upper hemi-continuity of the signalling equilibria holds.
